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PRPL Q2 2020 Earnings Expectations

PRPL Q2 2020 Earnings Expectations

tl;dr - Earnings is gonna be lit!

PRPL earnings is tomorrow, 8/13, after hours. Any other date is wrong. Robinhood is wrong (why are you using Robinhood still!?!).
I'm going to take you through my earnings projections and reasoning as well the things to look for in the earnings release and the call that could make this moon even further.

Earnings Estimates

https://preview.redd.it/w3qad4gb9ng51.png?width=854&format=png&auto=webp&s=7a88656a9867d0e40710736f61974a22b5f4a631
I'm calling $244M Net Revenue with $39.75M in Net Income, which would be $0.75 Diluted EPS. I'll walk you through how I got here

Total Net Revenue

I make the assumption that Purple is still selling every mattress it can make (since that is what they said for April and May) and that this continued into June because the website was still delayed 7-14 days across all mattresses at the end of June.
May Revenue and April DTC: The numbers in purple were provided by Purple here and here.
April Wholesale: My estimate of $2.7M for Wholesale sales in April comes from this statement from the Q1 earnings release: " While wholesale sales were down 42.7% in April year-over-year, weekly wholesale orders have started to increase on a sequential basis. " I divided Q2 2019's wholesale sales evenly between months and then went down 42.7%.
June DTC: This is my estimate based upon the fact that another Mattress Max machine went online June 1, thus increasing capacity, and the low end model was discontinued (raising revenue per unit).
June Wholesale: Joe Megibow stated at Commerce Next on 7/30 that wholesale had returned to almost flat growth. I'm going to assume he meant for the quarter, so I plugged the number here to finish out the quarter at $39.0M, just under $39.3M from a year ago.

Revenue Expectations from Analysts (via Yahoo)
https://preview.redd.it/notxd6hhbng51.png?width=384&format=png&auto=webp&s=aa0453414f467aa6c5bf72ce8a8046c0ae6e62a5
My estimate of $244M comes in way over the high, let alone the consensus. PRPL has effectively already disclosed ~$145M for April/May, so these expectations are way off. I'm more right than they are.

Gross Margins

I used my estimates for Q3/Q4 2019 to guide margins in April/May as there were some one time events that occurred in Q1 depressing margins. June has higher margin because of the shift away from the low end model (which is priced substantially lower than the high end model). Higher priced models were given manufacturing priority.

Operating Expenses

Marketing and Sales
Joe mentioned in the Commerce Next video that they were able to scale sales at a constant CAC (Customer Acquisition Cost). There's three ways of interpreting this:
  1. Overall customer acquisition cost was constant with previous quarters (assume $36M total, not $93.2M), which means you need to add another $57M to bottom line profit and $1.08 to EPS, or
  2. Customer Acquisition Costs on a unit basis were constant, which means I'm still overstating total marketing expense and understating EPS massively, or
  3. Customer Acquisition Costs on a revenue basis were constant, which is the most conservative approach and the one I took for my estimate.
I straightlined the 2.2 ratio of DTC sales to Marketing costs from Q1. I am undoubtably too high in my expense estimate here as PRPL saw marketing efficiencies and favorable revenue shifts during the quarter. So, $93.2M
General and Administrative
A Purple HR rep posted on LinkedIn about hiring 330 people in the quarter. I'm going to assume that was relative to the pre-COVID furloughs, so I had June at that proportional amount to previous employees and adjusted April and May for furloughs and returns from furlough.
Research and Development
I added just a little here and straight lined it.

Other Expenses

Interest Expense
Straightlined from previous quarters, although they may have tapped ABL lines and so forth, so this could be under.
One Time and Other
Unpredictable by nature.
Warrant Liability Accrual
I'm making some assumptions here.
  1. We know that the secondary offering event during Q2 from the Pearce brothers triggered the clause for the loan warrants (NOT the PRPLW warrants) to lower the strike price to $0.
  2. I can't think of a logical reason why the warrant holders wouldn't exercise at this point.
  3. Therefore there is no longer a warrant liability where the company may need to repurchase warrants back.
  4. The liability accrual of $7.989M needs to be reversed out for a gain.
This sucker is worth about $0.15 EPS on its own.

Earnings (EPS)

I project $39.75M or $0.75 Diluted EPS (53M shares). How does this hold up to the analysts?
EPS Expectations from Analysts (via Yahoo)
https://preview.redd.it/o2i1dvk6hng51.png?width=373&format=png&auto=webp&s=27e63f7934d85393e1f7b87bf2e2066c28047202
EPS Expectations from Analysts (via MarketBeat)
https://preview.redd.it/psu5rajfhng51.png?width=1359&format=png&auto=webp&s=0612d43777c644789b14f8c5decbe36f41925f5e
These losers are way under. Now you know why I am so optimistic about earnings.
Keep in mind, these analysts are still giving $28-$30 price targets.

What to Watch For During Earnings (aka Reasons Why This Moons More)

Analysts, Institutionals, and everyone else who uses math for investing is going to be listening for the following:
  • Margin Growth
  • Warrant Liability Accrual
  • Capacity Expansion Rate
  • CACs (Customer Acquisition Costs)
  • New Product Categories
  • Cashless Exercise of PRPLW warrants

Margin Growth
This factor is HUGE. If PRPL guides to higher margins due to better sales mix and continued DTC shift, then every analyst and investor is going to tweak their models up in a big way. Thus far, management has been relatively cautious about this fortuitous shift to DTC continuing. If web traffic is any indicator, it will, but we need management to tell us that.
Warrant Liability Accrual
I could be dead wrong on my assumptions above on this one. If it stays, there will be questions about it due to the drop in exercise price. It does impact GAAP earnings (although it shouldn't--stupid accountants).
Capacity Expansion Rate
This is a BIG one as well. As PRPL has been famously capacity constrained: their rate of manufacturing capacity expansion is their growth rate over the next year. PRPL discontinued expansion at the beginning of COVID and then re-accelerated it to a faster pace than pre-COVID by hurrying the machines in-process out to the floor. They also signed their manufacturing space deal which has nearly doubled manufacturing space a quarter early. The REAL question is when the machines will start rolling out. Previous guidance was end of the year at best. If we get anything sooner than that, we are going to ratchet up.
CACs (Customer Acquisition Costs)
Since DTC is the new game in town, we are all going to want to understand exactly where marketing expenses were this quarter and, more importantly, where management thinks they are going. The magic words to listen for are "marketing efficiencies". Those words means the stock goes up. This is the next biggest line item on the P&L besides revenue and cost of goods sold.
New Product Categories
We heard the VP of Brand from Purple give us some touchy-feely vision of where the company is headed and that mattresses was just the revenue generating base to empower this. I'm hoping we hear more about this. This is what differentiated Amazon from Barnes and Noble: Amazon's vision was more than just books. Purple sees itself as more than just mattresses. Hopefully we get some announced action behind that vision. This multiplies the stock.
Cashless Exercise of PRPLW Warrants
I doubt this will be answered, even if the question is asked. I bet they wait until the 20 out of 30 days is up and they deliver notice. We could be pleasantly surprised. If management informs us that they will opt for cashless exercise of the warrants, this is anti-dilutive to EPS. It will reduce the number of outstanding shares and automatically cause an adjustment up in the stock price (remember kids, some people use math when investing). I'm hopeful, but not expecting it. The amount of the adjustment depends on the current price of the stock. Also, I fully expect PRPL management to use their cashless exercise option at the end of the 20 out of 30 days as they are already spitting cash.

Positions


https://preview.redd.it/tho65crvkng51.png?width=1242&format=png&auto=webp&s=6241ff5e8b26744f9d7119ddef7da86f163c741d
I'm not just holding, I added.
PRPLW Warrants: 391,280
PRPL Call Debit Spreads: 17.5c/25c 8/21 x90, 20c/25c 8/21 x247
Also, I bought some CSPR 7.5p 8/21 x200 for fun because I think that sucker is going to get shamed back down to $6 after a real mattress company shows what it can do.

UPDATES

I've made some updates to the model, and produced two different models:
  1. Warrant Liability Accrual Goes to Zero
  2. Warrant Liability Accrual Goes to $47M
I made the following adjustments generally:
  • I reduced marketing expenses signifanctly based upon comments made by Joe Megibox on 6/29 in this CNBC video to 30% of sales (thanks u/deepredsky).
  • I reduced June wholesale revenue to 12.6M to be conservative based upon another possible interpretation of Joe's comments in this video here. It is a hard pill to swallow that June wholesale sales would be less than May's. The only reasoning I can think of is if May caused a large restock and then June tapered back off. The previous number of $19.0M was still a retrenchment from the 40-50% YoY growth rate. I'm going to keep the more conservative number (thanks again u/deepredsky).
  • I modified the number of outstanding shares used for EPS calculations from 53M (last quarters number used on the 10-Q) to almost 73M based upon the fact that all of the warrants and employee stock options are now in the money. Math below. (thanks DS_CPA1 on Stocktwits for pointing this out)
Capital Structure for EPS Calculations
From the recent S-3 filing for the May secondary, I pulled the following:
https://preview.redd.it/qw7awg8w7sg51.png?width=368&format=png&auto=webp&s=66c884682ddb8517939468ab1e6780742f55d427
I diluted earnings by the above share count.

Model With Warrant Liability Going to Zero
https://preview.redd.it/cz2ydomi4sg51.png?width=852&format=png&auto=webp&s=53cc457a3143cabb16bfff9a1503054a9a8c0fca
Model With Warrant Liability Going to $47M
https://preview.redd.it/o2hltrgf5sg51.png?width=853&format=png&auto=webp&s=41cbe73a7aa0894a86a09ccc9179b100e9d3372d
A few people called me out on my assumption, that I also said could be wrong. My favorite callout came from u/lawschoolbluesny who started all smug and condescending, and proceeded to tell me about June 31st, from which I couldn't stop laughing. Stay in law school bud a bit longer...
https://preview.redd.it/dd4tcdue4sg51.png?width=667&format=png&auto=webp&s=d27f3ad40c702502ee62f106b6135f0db2c1e7be
One other comment he made needs an answer because WHY we are accruing MATTERS a lot!
Now that we have established that coliseum still has not exercised the options as of july 7, and that purple needs to record as a liability the fair value of the options as of june 31, we now need to determine what that fair value is. You state that since you believe that there is no logical reason that coliseum won't redeem their warrants "there is no longer a warrant liability where the company may need to repurchase warrants back." While I'm not 100% certain your logic here, I can say for certain that whether or not a person will redeem their warrants does not dictate how prpl accounts for them.

The warrant liability accrual DOES NOT exist because the warrants simply exist. The accrual exists because the warrants give the warrant holder the right to force the company to buy back the warrants for cash in the event of a fundamental transaction for Black Scholes value ($18 at the end of June--June 31st that is...). And accruals are adjusted for the probability of a particular event happening, which I STILL argue is close to zero.
A fundamental transaction did occur. The Pearce brothers sold more than 10M shares of stock which is why the exercise price dropped to zero. (Note for DS_CPA1 on Stocktwits: there is some conflicting filings as to what the exercise price can drop to. The originally filed warrant draft says that the warrant exercise price cannot drop to zero, but asubsequently filed S-3, the exercise price is noted as being able to go to zero. I'm going with the S-3.)
Now, here is where it gets fun. We know from from the Schedule 13D filed with a July 1, 2020 event date from Coliseum that Coliseum DID NOT force the company to buy back the warrants in the fundamental transaction triggered by the Pearce Brothers (although they undoubtably accepted the $0 exercise price). THIS fundamental transaction was KNOWN to PRPL at the end Q4 and Q1 as secondary filings were made the day after earnings both times. This drastically increased the probability of an event happening.
Where is the next fundamental transaction that could cause the redemption for cash? It isn't there. What does exist is a callback option if the stock trades above $24 for 20 out of 30 days, which we are already 8 out of 10 days into.
Based upon the low probability of a fundamental transaction triggering a redemption, the accrual will stay very low. Even the CFO disagrees with me and we get a full-blown accrual, I expect a full reversal of the accrual next quarter if the 20 out of 30 day call back is exercised by the company.
I still don't understand why Coliseum would not have exercised these.
Regardless, the Warrant Liability Accrual is very fake and will go away eventually.

ONE MORE THING...

Seriously, stop PMing me with stupid, simple questions like "What are your thoughts on earnings?", "What are your thoughts on holding through earnings?", and "What are your thoughts on PRPL?".
It's here. Above. Read it. I'm not typing it again in PM. I've gotten no less than 30 of these. If you're too lazy to read, I'm too lazy to respond to you individually.

submitted by lurkingsince2006 to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

PRPL Important Info

Not my work but tons of valid points are being made.
My reaction to the Q2 results: a good quarter once you sift through all the noise. As I had mentioned in prior posts, beware of revenue recognition compared to the orders data. Little did we know it was a bigger impact (as mentioned on the earnings call, it appears the time between book to bill can be 2-4 weeks). What this means is that July will be a very strong month and August is continuing the momentum. On the call, the team mentioned that the company is "shipping each mattress as fast as they make them" and lead times for online orders are still 10 days despite increasing capacity. You can see this as cash increased $70MM in the quarter but operating income was only $30MM and inventory only explains $10M of the incremental benefit. Note that the company is also capping new retail locations until more capacity comes online - there is no question in their minds about sustainability as they make a big investment in production.
Why is the stock declining AH? Simple - the top line miss surprised people including me given the news released on orders (though note not a fundamental change in demand, it is timing) and it seems people don't understand non-cash expenses. First is the warrants, second is the tax asset. These do not reflect the company's ability to generate cash and profitability but are rather accounting changes. The reality is the company generated $35M of EBITDA or nearly $0.60 cents adjusted EPS in one quarter. That means the company is runrating at $2-$2.50/year in EPS and $140MM in EBITDA (assuming Q2 is reflective, even though it included one shit month with April due to COVID). $2-2.50 x 20 PE still stands -> price target is $40-50. That also correlates to a mid teens TEV/EBITDA multiple.
To summarize, revenues came in lighter than analyst expectations by about $10M; HOWEVER, EBITDA (operating cash flow) came in 2x estimates at nearly $35MM. This is what matters as the demand picture is as robust, if not more, than people expected, but just driven by the timing of orders to sales conversion. And this includes April, which was a shittier quarter. The true runrate of the quarter was probably closer to $45-$50MM.
Some other tidbits: the business model is proving more scalable than thought - gross margins improved from the low 40s to nearly 50%. That is an outrageous improvement. Will it last through 2H? Not entirely, but my assumption is that we will still see 45-48% margins through year end. No one was modeling this. Separately, SG&A % of sales came down nearly 10% - again, it will increase, but much better than thought and will provide a tailwind into YE.
Net net, Q2 was a good quarter, EBITDA much stronger than anyone anticipated, and Q3 will be incredibly strong as August is in the bag with backlog + the business maintaining DTC momentum while ramping up wholesale per the earnings CC. Those invested in shares and long term options/warrants will be rewarded. The recent short term investors in near term calls and other BS will likely lose out.
Shares will trade lower tomorrow, likely remain depressed in the $20-$23 range for a week or two and then start building back up into the $25-$30 range and $30+ as analyst coverage updates their models and price targets.
The biggest drawback of the call is that the leadership team completely sandbagged the story and made it seem unexciting (despite everything to the contrary). I know there is a balance of tempering good results with caution, though Jeff Megibow took it to a whole new level (margins will come down, advertising costs will increase, new GA facility will add cost and suck wind, etc etc). While this is true, it obfuscates the actual business improvements underway. Would strongly consider they reevaluate the communications strategy and believe they did this thinking that the reaction to the results was going to be overwhelmingly positive.
And for the love of God if any senior leadership at PRPL read these forums, you should report an Adjusted EPS / Share so the headlines know what to report. This is what is leading to the AH trading disaster - report it as "adjusted net income per share was $0.60" and then you don't have this issue.
submitted by mistaitaly420 to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Singapore is a Meritocracy* [EXTRA LONG POST]

Singapore is a Meritocracy* [EXTRA LONG POST]
Edit: Thank you for all the comments and chat messages! I'm trying to go through each one. Writing thoughtful comments in the midst of having a full-time job is HARD WORK. I think I've missed a few questions, drop me a message if you're interested in continuing a discussion, I'm open to listening! There has been a lot of good comments, a few with great perspectives, and now I have a whole lot of things to read up on.
---
Now that the 2020 General Election is firmly in our rear-view mirror, there is something that I have been meaning to write about: institutionalized racism affecting the minorities, especially the Malays, in Singapore. If you are groaning at this thinking you have been misled by this post’s title, I assure you that by the end of this post you will understand the caveat behind the above-mentioned title. I plead for a little of your time and patience.
We have seen many discussions online about majority privilege and systemic racism impacting the minorities. Many of you may have even participated in some of these discussions. I will not try to explain those terms for they have already been repeatedly debated to death. What this post aims to achieve is to bring to light Singapore’s history and government policies that have either benefited the majority race or kneecapped the minority race. Or both.
Why am I doing this?
It is frustrating to see some Singaporeans fully buying into the narrative that Singapore is a truly meritocratic society; that the government’s policies do not discriminate against minorities, or if a Singaporean worked hard enough he or she will succeed (whatever the definition of success is), or that we have anti-discriminatory laws that protect the minorities. Some even claim that the Malays enjoy special privileges due to Section 152 of the Constitution describing the special position of Malays, and that the Malays are blessed with free education in Singapore.
Section 152, “Special Position”, free education for all Malays?
Minorities and special position of Malays
152.—(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Government constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore.
(2) The Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as to recognise the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language.
The oft-mentioned Section 152 of the Constitution was an administrative continuation of previously existing colonial policy towards the Malays [Col: 126]. Regardless of the “special position” of the Malays, the only form of assistance rendered to the Malays was the policy of free education for all Malay students. This minimal approach of the government did little to improve the educational and socio-economic standing of the Malays as revealed by the 1980 national census. The free tertiary education policy was ultimately removed in 1990, despite opposition from Malays who questioned the constitutionality of its removal [col: 126].
With free education for all Malays, why haven’t their socio-economic and educational standings improved?
There are many factors to look at, and the issue goes way back to the colonial era so that’s where we shall start. The colonial administrators of Singapore, in their pursuit of capitalistic gains, had little use for the native inhabitants. The natives who were already living off their own land had no desire to work for the British as labourers. The British saw this unwillingness to work for them as indolence, and ascribed many other negative cultural stereotypes to the locals [pdf]. Nailing home the capitalistic intent of colonial presence in Singapore, the British Director of Education R. O. Winstedt explained their policy for education for the natives in 1920 [pg. 2]:
"The aim of the government is not to turn out a few well-educated youths, nor a number of less well-educated boys; rather it is to improve the bulk of the people, and to make the son of a fisherman or a peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than his father had been, and a man whose education will enable him to understand how his lot in life fits in with the scheme of life around him".
And in 1915, a British resident revealed the colonial attitude towards education [pg. 3]:
"The great object of education is to train a man to make a living.... you can teach Malays so that they do not lose their skill and craft in fishing and jungle work. Teach them the dignity of manual labour, so that they do not all become krannies (clerks) and I am sure you will not have the trouble which has arisen in India through over education"
The type and quality of education that the British set up for the native inhabitants show that they had no intentions to empower the locals with skills for a new economy. The education provided, while free, was to make sure the locals were kept out of trouble for the British, and remain subservient to the colonial causes. Further impeding the socio-economic status of Malays, the British actively discouraged Malays in switching from agricultural production to more lucrative cash crops, preventing the building of wealth among the Malay communities (Shahruddin Ma’arof, 1988: 51). In contrast to the British suppression of the buildup of Malay wealth and provision of vernacular education, Chinese businessmen, clan associations and Christian missionaries established Chinese schools where students were taught skills like letter-writing and the use of the abacus. By the turn of the 20th century, the curriculum in these Chinese-language schools expanded to include arithmetic, science, history and geography while Malay-language schools under Winstedt’s educational policies focused on vernacular subjects such as basket-weaving.
So, when Singapore attained self-governance, did things get better?
Discontent with the education system and social inequalities was already a big issue in the mid 1950s that the parties that contested for the Legislative Assembly championed for reforms to social issues like better education systems, housing subsidies and workers rights.
The People’s Action Party (PAP) won the 1959 Legislative Assembly general elections by running on a rather progressive platform of low-cost housing, improvement of employment opportunities for locals and a stronger education. They also campaigned for abolishing the inequality of wealth in their election manifesto (Petir, 1958: 2), with PAP chairman Dr Toh Chin Chye expressing his disgust at seeing “so many of our people reduced to living like animals because under the present social and economic system, the good things of life are for the ruthless few, those who believe that the poor and the humble are despicable failures.”
With the PAP in power, assurances were made to Singaporeans that no community would be left behind. In 1965, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew promised aid specifically to help raise the economic and education levels of the Malays. In 1967 during a mass rally at Geylang Serai, PM Lee again promised that “the Government with the support of the non-Malays are prepared to concentrate more than the average share of our resources on our Malay citizens [pdf].” He emphasized the importance of lifting all sections of the community to an even footing, reasoning that “if one section of the community were to lag behind it would harm the unity and integrity of the nation” (Bedlington, 1974: 289).
Despite these promises to help the minorities narrow the inequality gap, very little was done to realize it. Instead, the government took a ruthless approach towards economic growth, sparing no expense. Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee explained the government’s main concern was “to generate fast economic growth by any and every possible means. . . . If unequal distribution of income induced greater savings and investment . . . then this must be accepted as the price of fighting unemployment.” (Goh, 1972: 275)
By the late 1970s, a strong shift in parents’ preference towards an English-medium education for their children had resulted in a rapid decline in the number of vernacular schools.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shift of parents’ preference towards educating their child in the English stream. This shift, together with a period of minimal intervention in terms of educational policy and assistance to the minorities by the government, caused the number of enrolments in vernacular schools to rapidly decline. The socio-economic gap also widened between the Malays and Chinese, as the Chinese community enjoyed greater occupational mobility relative to the minorities. This can be seen in the shift in the lower manual occupation category, from a relatively equal proportion in 1957 to a 10 percent difference in 1980 [Table A]. In 1980, the average Malay household income was only 73.8 percent of the average Chinese household income. The income gap widened considerably by 1990, where the average Malay household income dropped to 69.8 percent of the average Chinese household income [Table B] (Rahim, 1998: 19-22). Decades after the lofty promises were made by the government, the Malay community’s slide into marginality continued.
Table A

Table B
Wait, the gap got bigger? Did the government do anything?
In 1979, Education Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee with the Education Study Team released a report on the Ministry of Education, more widely known as the Goh Report. The team was made up of 13 members, most of them systems analysts and economists, and none of whom ‘possess much knowledge or expertise on education’ (Goh Report, 1979: 1). The all-Chinese team excluded social scientists and educationalists, as the Education Minister had little regard for their expertise (Rahim, 1998: 121). The Goh Report made recommendations for radical changes to the educational system, recommendations which then became the basis of the New Education System (NES).
During a time when Tamil, Malay and Chinese schools were getting closed down due to declining enrolment numbers due to the popularity of English medium ones, the Special Assistance Plan (SAP) was introduced in 1978 to preserve and develop nine Chinese schools into bilingual (Mandarin and English) schools while retaining the values and traditions of a Chinese school. As part of the NES, these schools were to be the only ones to offer the Special course which the top 10 percent scorers of the PSLE are eligible to opt for. With these schools getting more resources, better facilities and the best teachers, the SAP contradicts the multi-racial principle of giving equal treatment to the non-English language streams. This exclusivity and the elite status of SAP schools affords its students better opportunities and advantages that are virtually out of reach for many minorities in Singapore. Effectively, the SAP is an institutionalized form of ethnic/cultural favouritism (Rahim, 1998: 130)
The NES also introduced early streaming for students which further exacerbated existing inequalities. Despite primary school education being free for all Singaporeans, families with better financial means have a huge advantage in preparing their child for streaming through additional tuition and better preschool choices#. (Barr & Low, 2005: 177) As we have seen from the disparity in household incomes between the Chinese and Malays, early streaming served to widen the gap between the haves and have-nots. The have-nots, more often than not, find themselves in the lower streams, trapped with very limited options providing upward social mobility. They will have to face an insurmountable task to lift themselves and their future generations out of their current predicament.
In 1982, the PAP slogan “a more just and equal society” was quietly dropped from the party’s constitution. This signaled an end to the socialist ideals that the party built its identity upon.
Why? It can’t be that the government favours one race over another...can it?
Examining the PAP leadership’s attitude towards the different cultures and ethnicities is key to understanding what the government values and how these values shaped its policies. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, as quoted in the Goh Report, extolled the values of East Asian philosophies: "The greatest value in the teaching and learning of Chinese is in the transmission of the norms of social or moral behaviour. This means principally Confucianist beliefs and ideas, of man [sic], society and the state" (Goh, 1979: v). The government’s championing of SAP schools and ‘Chinese values’ is also complemented by the launch of ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign’ in 1979.
In 1991, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong espoused similar values as his predecessor, praising the virtues of ‘Confucian dynamism’ and claiming that Singapore would not be able to thrive and prosper without the Confucian core values of thrift, hard work and group cohesion. The fear of erosion of the Chinese cultural identity was never matched with a similar concern for the erosion of minority cultural identities, where the minorities were “expected to submit to a form of partial or incomplete assimilation into a Chinese-generated, Chinese-dominated society.#” (Barr & Low, 2005: 167)
On top of favouring Chinese cultural values and identities, the PAP leadership associated the cultures of the minorities with negative connotations. Speaking about a Malay who did well in business, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew described the man as “acting just like a Chinese. You know, he’s bouncing around, running around, to-ing and fro-ing. In the old culture, he would not be doing that” (Han, et al., 1998: 184). In a Straits Times article on 26 June 1992, SM Lee also implied that the Chinese are inherently better at Maths, and that "If you pretend that the problem does not exist, and that in fact (the Malays) can score as well as the Chinese in Maths, then you have created yourself an enormous myth which you will be stuck with.+"
These attitudes from the ruling elite translated into more policies that preserved the advantage of the majority. When faced with the “pressing national problem”* of a declining birth-rate of the Chinese, the government took steps to ensure Chinese numerical dominance in Singapore. The Singapore government encouraged the immigration of skilled workers from countries like Hong Kong, Korea, and Macau, countries which were accorded the status of ‘traditional sources’ of foreign labour (Rahim, 1998: 72). Meanwhile, showing the government’s preference and/or dislike for specific groups of people, Malaysian Malays faced great difficulty in getting work permits. (“‘Harder’ for bumiputras to get S’pore work permits.+”, The Straits Times, 7 Mar 1991)
Another policy which worked to preserve the advantage of the majority was the urban resettlement programmes of the 1960s and 1970s. This resulted in the dissolution of the Malay electoral strongholds in the east, undermining the organic growth of Malay political grassroots. When it became apparent in the 1980s that the Malays were moving back to the traditional Malay residential areas, an ethnic residential quota, labelled the Ethnic Integration Policy, was implemented. The rationale behind the quota was to ensure a balanced racial mix, purportedly for racial harmony. However, this rationale does not stand up to scrutiny in the face of numerous academic studies on interethnic urban attitudes and relations**. Another consequence of the policy is the reinforcement of racial segregation when taking into account the income disparity between the races. Underlining the weakness of the government’s reasoning, constituencies like Hougang were allowed to remain Chinese residential enclaves despite its population being approximately 80 percent Chinese. (Rahim, 1998: 73-77)
Perhaps the most controversial policy introduced was the Graduate Mothers Scheme. It was introduced in 1983 to reverse the trend of falling fertility rates of graduate women versus the rising birth-rate of non-graduate women***. In a push to encourage graduate mothers to get married and have children, Deputy Prime Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee unveiled a suite of incentives; all-expenses paid love-boat cruises for eligible graduate singles in the civil service, a computer dating service, fiscal incentives, and special admissions to National University of Singapore (NUS) to even out the male-female student ratio#. At the other end of the spectrum, lesser-educated women were encouraged to have smaller families in a scheme called the Small Family Incentive Scheme. This was achieved by paying out a housing grant worth S$10,000 to women who were able to meet the following set of conditions: be below 30 years of age, have two or less children, educational level not beyond secondary school, have a household income totalling not more than S$1,500 and willing to be sterilized#.
Based on the average household income statistics, a simple deduction could be made that those eligible for the sterilization programme were disproportionately from the minority communities.
Isn’t that eugenics?
Yes. Singapore had a government-established Eugenics Board.
The graduate mothers and sterilization programmes were greatly unpopular and were ultimately abandoned or modified after the PAP’s mandate took a 12.9 percent hit in the 1984 general election. However that did not mean that eugenics stopped being an influence in policy-making.
In his 1983 National Day address, PM Lee stated that when it comes to intelligence, “80 per cent is nature, or inherited, and 20 per cent the differences from different environments and upbringing.” This is telling of the role that eugenics, biological determinist and cultural deficit theories played in the formation of PAP policies.
To further safeguard Singapore from “genetic pollution” (Rahim, 1998: 55, Tremewan, 1994: 113), the Ministry of Labour in 1984 issued a marriage restriction between work permit holders and Singaporeans. The work permit holder would have his work permit cancelled, be deported and be permanently barred from re-entering Singapore if he were to marry a Singaporean or permanent resident without obtaining prior approval. Approval from the Commissioner for Employment would only be given if the work permit holder possesses skills and qualifications of value to Singapore.
Doesn’t sound to me like the government targets any particular race with its policies.
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 1987 rationalized that certain posts in the Singapore Armed Forces had been closed to Malays for "national security" reasons. He claimed that this policy was implemented to avoid placing Malays in an awkward position when loyalty to nation and religion came into conflict. PM Lee also added that the Malays behaved more as Malay Muslims than as loyal Singaporeans. PM Lee and DPM Lee’s statements finally made explicit what many suspected to have been an implicit rule. It could be observed that, despite being overrepresented in the civil service, Malays tend to stay in the lower-to-middle rungs of organizations like the SAF. It is also noteworthy that, to date, no Malay has held important Cabinet portfolios such as Minister of Defence, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Trade and Industry.
The conflation of loyalty to the country with approval of the ruling party proved to be patently flawed, as studies by the Institute of Policy Studies (ST, 30 Sept 1990: 22; IPS, 2010) indicate that Singaporean Malays showed a stronger sense of national pride and identification compared to the other major ethnic groups. The study also found that Citizen-Nation Psychological Ties (CNP) scores, that is, national loyalty, weakens with: higher socio-economic status, Chinese, youth, and political alienation. Even when the Malays have been historically disenfranchised, they were found to be proud to be Singaporeans, loyal to Singapore and more willing to sacrifice for the nation than the other ethnic groups.
Additionally, Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong threatened to withhold aid to the Malay self-help organization Mendaki in 1988. The threat was issued over an incident during election night where several Malays in a crowd of Workers Party supporters had jeered at PM Goh at a vote counting centre. It became apparent from this incident that any aid offered by the government was tied to loyalty to the PAP instead of it being the duty of the government to serve Singaporeans regardless of party affiliation^^.
There have always been Malay PAP Members of Parliament (MP), did they not help fight for these issues?
The Malay PAP MPs are in the unique position of having to represent not only people of their constituents but also the rest of the Malay Singaporeans while toeing the party line. With many of the government policies being unhelpful towards the Malays, it is near impossible to fulfill this role satisfactorily. PAP MPs Ahmad Haleem (Telok Blangah) and Sha’ari Tadin (Kampong Chai Chee, Bedok) were both made to enjoy early retirements from their political careers for bringing up “sensitive” issues of the Malay community^^^. This set the tone for future PAP Malay MPs to remain unquestioningly in step with the leadership, regardless of their personal agreement, in order to have a long career within the party. Today, Malay PAP MPs have continued with the trend of parroting PAP policies that ran against the interests of the Malay/Muslim community (e.g. Environment and Water Resources Minister Masagos Zulkifli and Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Yaacob Ibrahim with regards to the tudung issue).
What about the Mendaki and the Tertiary Tuition Fee Subsidy (TTFS)?
The policy providing free education for all Malays was ended in 1990 despite opposition from the Malays and the opposition party[Col: 126]. In its place, Mendaki introduced TTFS in 1991 to subsidise the cost of tertiary education in local institutions for those living in low household income. Due to the long history of marginalization and the widening of the inequality gap, the number of Malays who were able to make it to tertiary education institutions, especially in local universities, have been disproportionately low compared to the other ethnic groups. As such, the number of students able to benefit from this subsidy is even lower.
It was only recently, 20 years after the introduction of the subsidy, that the criteria for eligibility underwent revision. The revision takes into account the size of the family of the applicant, allowing for more Malay students to benefit from it. However, this subsidy is only one measure in an attempt to ensure that Malays students who were able to qualify for tertiary education are able to do so. Short of totally ditching streaming, more care, thought and resources are needed to lift the quality and accessibility of education for the Malays, especially in the early years of a child’s education.
So what needs to happen now?
Singaporeans, especially politicians, need to move on from making assertions similar to what PM Lee had made in 1987, that the "problem is psychological . . . if they try hard enough and long enough, then the education gap between them and the Chinese, or them and the Indians, would close. . . . Progress or achievement depends on ability and effort." It is important for Singaporeans to recognize the nearly Sisyphean task faced by marginalized communities in improving their socio-economic standing. Handicapped right from the start, their perceived failures in our “meritocratic” society should not be judged as an indictment of their efforts, but influenced in no small measure by the failings of the state in dragging their feet to take action. As a community, Singaporeans need to actively combat negative stereotyping, and move away from policies that were rooted in eugenics. Government intervention into ensuring unbiased, fair hiring practices would also help in raising the standing of the marginalized minorities. It would be impossible for Singapore to live up to its multiracial, meritocratic ideals without making fundamental changes to the above mentioned policies.
---
# Academic journal behind a paywall. Most tertiary institutions should have partnerships with these journals, so you are likely able view them if you have a student email address.
+ Online scan of the article is unavailable
\* The declining birth-rate of the Chinese was one of three pressing national problems, according to PM Lee in a National Day rally speech in 1988; the others being education and the growing number of unmarried graduates [at approx 29 mins].
\* From Lily Zubaidah Rahim’s* The Singapore Dilemma (1998: 76-77): Rabushka’s (Rabushka, Alvin (1971), ‘Integration in Urban Malaya: Ethnic Attitudes Among Malays and Chinese’, 91-107) study found that it was common for people living in ethnically homogeneous areas to adopt favourable attitudes towards other ethnic groups. People who resided in ethnically mixed areas but did not mix with other ethnic groups were also found to hold negative attitudes towards others. He postulated that physical proximity coupled with superficial interaction across ethnic lines may in fact lead to heightened contempt for other ethnic groups. Urban studies (Fischer, Claude (1976), The Urban Experiment*) have similarly found that close physical distance of different ethnic groups does not necessarily result in narrowing the social distance between the communities. Indeed, physical ethnic proximity in large cities may well engender mutual revulsion and a heightening of ethnocentrism. These research findings have been corroborated by several Singaporean studies (Hassan, Riaz (1977),* ‘Families in Flats: A Study of Low Income Families in Public Housing’; Lai, Ah Eng (1995), ‘Meanings of Multiethnicity: A Case Study of Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Singapore’) which have found interethnic relations in the ethnically integrated public housing flats to be relatively superficial.
\** In the same article, PM Lee drew a straight line connecting the Malays with lower educational levels in this line of rhetoric questioning: “Why is the birth rate between the Malays, and the Chinese and Indians so different? Because the educational levels achieved are also different.”*
^ The stronger representation of Malays in civil service and Western multinational corporations was likely due to the difficulty in seeking employment in local firms. Prevalence of negative stereotyping of Malays meant that a Malay job applicant has to be much better qualified to be considered for a job in a local firm (Rahim, 1998: 25). A recent study into this phenomenon can be found here#.
^^ The PAP’s quid pro quo policy was put under the spotlight again in 2011, when PM Lee made it clear that the government’s neighbourhood upgrading programmes prioritised PAP wards over opposition wards.
^^^ PAP MP Ahmad Haleem raised the “sensitive” issue of the government’s exclusionary policy towards Malays in National Service, which adversely affected socio-economic standing of the Malay community [Col: 144]. PAP MP Sha’ari Tadin was actively involved in Malay community organizations and helped to organize a 1971 seminar on Malay participation in national development (Rahim, 1998: 90).
---
Recommended Reading:
The Myth of the Lazy Native: A study of the image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th century and its function in the ideology of colonial capitalism [pdf].
The Singapore Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of the Malay Community.
Eugenics on the rise: A report from Singapore#.
Assimilation as multiracialism: The case of Singapore’s Malay#.
Racism and the Pinkerton syndrome in Singapore: effects of race on hiring decisions#.
---
References:
Bedlington, Stanley (1974), The Singapore Malay Community: The Politics of State Integration, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University.
Chew, Peter K.H. (2008), Racism in Singapore: A Review and Recommendations for Future Research, James Cook University, Singapore.
Fook Kwang Han, Warren Fernandez, Sumiko Tan (1998) Lee Kuan Yew, the Man and His Ideas, Singapore Press Holding.
Goh, Keng Swee (1972), The Economics of Modernization and Other Essays, Singapore: Asia Pacific Press.
Michael D. Barr & Jevon Low (2005) Assimilation as multiracialism: The case of Singapore's Malays, Asian Ethnicity, 6:3, 161-182, DOI: 10.1080/14631360500226606
Rahim, Lily Z. (1998), The Singapore Dilemma: The political and educational marginality of the Malay community, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press.
Shaharuddin Ma’aruf (1988), Malay Ideas on Development: From Feudal Lord to Capitalist, Times Book International, Singapore.
Tremewan, Christopher (1994), The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, London, Macmillan.
submitted by cherenkov_blue to singapore [link] [comments]

McDo PH: no full recovery before 2022, fast food forever changed (Tuesday, Aug 11)

Happy Tuesday, Barkada --

The PSE closed up 85 points to 5931 ▲1.45%.

Thank you to microrama, LemonDoping, and xtiankahoy for the words of support and encouragement, and to Michael for his email question about my non-inclusion of the Consunji clan into the MB Family Showdown. I didn't exclude that family on purpose, they just don't really figure prominently in my investing "life", so I haven't had reason to deep dive into their holdings yet. Though, I will fix that this weekend!
Also, shout outs to PabloCesar2189, hadalaboforlyf, and dimaandal for wishing me and my baby well. She's not so "new" anymore, but still it's incredible how a baby can entirely re-write all the household bylaws and customs overnight. She's the best, but because she was born at Makati Med on the night of Koko Pimentel's Great Big COVID Adventure, it's been a white-knuckled, wild ride of self-isolation, quarantine, and Viber pedia checkups. I'm thankful, though, because both mother and daughter are happy and healthy and that's been my only goal.

Daily meme | Join MB | Today's email

COVID Update

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submitted by DuncnIdahosBandurria to phinvest [link] [comments]

Extreme Difficulty tips

Since my other post became excessively large and the title increasingly misleading, I've decided to post a separate guide.

Index

  1. Economy & Empire
  2. Resources
  3. Military
  4. Design
  5. Miscellaneous

1. Economy & Empire

2. Resources

3. Military

4. Design

5. Miscellaneous

Lastly, two off-topic tips:
A great way to test any game mechanic or ship build is to start a game at tech 7, or just backup one of your endgame saves for later use.
Star amount largely governs the drain on your PC's hardware. If you're experiencing stutter, consider playing on a less populated map. You can lower the map size to keep inter-system distances similar, though vast distances add a certain "deep space" charm to gameplay.
submitted by Gessie00 to DistantWorlds [link] [comments]

A Beginner's Guide to Oil

Everyone here is freaking out about oil, and literally every post is so incorrect and idiotic that I had to step in and put an end to this nonsense. Full disclose, I'm a professional trader. You might think you are a professional trader, but you're not. Professional traders get paid to trade with someone else's money not waste time lighting their own on fire. This is going to be long because there's been a varying degree of idiocy the last few days and I want to make sure no idiot is left behind.
So first, you need to understand what a futures contract is. You are basically agreeing on a price to buy/sell Oil at a FUTURE time. For the May contract it is today (4/21), the June contract is roughly a month from now. There are futures that go out for many years. If you trade the June 2024 contract, you are speculating on the price of oil that will be delivered in June 2024. If you make a plot of the prices of these futures contract with the y-axis being price and the x-axis being the expiration date and connect the dots, you end up with the futures curve. The shape of the curve is an expression of time preference. If the shape of the curve is going from lower left up and to the right, then the curve is said to be in Contango. This means that there is too much oil available now and people are not willing to pay a high price for it right now, but are willing to pay more to take delivery later. The opposite is when the curve is going from upper left to lower right. This is called Backwardation. This happens when there is a short term supply shortage. Imagine a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico shutting down oil rigs. There will be a shortage this month, but things will get back to normal in six months. Currently we are in Contango because there's too much oil being produced, and nobody is using it because of coronavirus. Some of you semi idiots have thought, "hey! why don't I just buy some front month oil futures and sell some back months and wait?" Well the problem is that you need to take delivery and store it. This has a cost, and it varies depending on many different factors. If you actually were an oil major and could do this (which they are). This would be called a positive carry trade meaning you get paid to just hold (carry) the trade.
Before we get further, there we also need to explain the delivery aspect of futures. Some futures like the SP500 futures are cash settled. That means at expiration, you get the difference paid to you in cash instead of getting SPY or a basket of 500 stocks delivered to you. Others, like the CL oil contract, are physically settled. This means that you will actually get 1000 barrels of physical oil at expiration and you cannot refuse it. Furthermore, futures contracts are meant to be fungible, but there has to be some standards otherwise people would just be delivering watered down oil all the time and the whole thing breaks down. The CL contract that went negative is based on West Texas Intermediate (WTI) delivered in Cushing, Oklahoma. There are many types of different crude oils delivered all over the place, but the other major futures contract is Brent Crude. That is oil from deep in the ocean somewhere off the coast of the UK. The reason I make this distinction is because Brent did not go negative yesterday. Why is that? Well because delivery location matters. Cushing, OK is landlocked. There are storage facilities onsite, but they're all full. Brent is waterborne. You can just send up another tanker ship fill it up and park it somewhere. What happened yesterday is that all the longs on CL who did not want to take delivery had to sell, but there was no one who wanted to take it at almost any price because they also had nowhere to store it. Interesting fact, many years ago WTI traded at a premium to Brent because the biggest user of oil was America and it was cheaper to get it in Oklahoma than ship it from Europe. Now it's the opposite. Nobody wants this landlocked oil.
So what are the implications? May expiration was an anomaly, if you expect to see -40 in the June contract, I can almost guarantee you won't. Longs have seen what can happen if you wait too long so they will sell earlier (as today's price action already shows). Also, the carry trade will get ramped up more. One day is not enough time to find a bunch of tanker trucks, but one month is.
If all that was too complex, here's an idiot's Q&A mostly collected from yesterday's posts
"OMG oils is so cheap, it's definitely going to be worth $40 in a few years, shouldn't I buy USO?"
Everyone who bought USO lately is completely fucked. This is really what prompted me to write this whole thing. USO historically buys the front month contract, waits until it's close to expiration and sells it and buys the next months. This is the exact opposite of the positive carry trade that professionals are doing. What they are doing is called rolling and assuming the world doesn't change soon, they will be losing $10 per barrel per month doing this. Also, they've gotten so large from the retail inflows lately that they've breached max size on CME so now they can only allocate 80% to the front month and 20% to the second month. This is all public info, so basically everyone knows that in a few weeks USO has to sell 30% of the open interest in the front month and buy that much in the second month. What do you think will happen to the prices of those contracts when they go to roll? Also, look at the price of the futures contract for 2024. They are already pricing in $40+ so USO already has that priced in and is just waiting to get destroyed on rolling each month.
The ETF "OIL" just announced they are liquidating.

"OMG oil is negative, let's buy a tanker ship and dump it in there
Good luck sailing your tanker ship to landlocked Cushing, OK. As stated above, this is why Brent Crude is not negative.
"Well I can just rent a bunch of tanker trucks for next month, can't I?"
All the big companies are lining up additional/weird storage capacity for next month. This is why I predict you won't see June go negative unless there are other technical issues like margin requirements and forced FCM liquidations.
"Some genius bought $10k worth of May 50 cent puts. They are sooo rich right?"
Wrong, options expire the week before the futures. Those options expired worthless
"Wow I never knew this about CL/USO/life. Is this because the Elite are keeping us down?"
No it's because you're too lazy to read contract specifications. No pro trades a product without fully understanding it.
USO fund prospectus:
http://www.uscfinvestments.com/documents/united-states-oil-fund-pro-20180228.pdf
CL contracts specs:
https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-oil/light-sweet-crude_contractSpecs_futures.html
CL delivery rules:
https://www.cmegroup.com/content/dam/cmegroup/rulebook/NYMEX/2/200.pdf
EDIT: fixed typo and added more to Q&A. If you have more dumb questions. I'll add them as I see them
submitted by bluecar223 to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Mortgage Servicing Crisis Explained

Pre:TLDR - it’s super long, if you aren’t full retard and want to understand this, read it. If you don’t have the brainpower, there a TLDR.
I'm a Loan Officer for one of the larger retail lenders. Here’s an overview of how the Fed gone and fucked over mortgage lenders.
Credit for the content below should go to Barry Habib of MBS Highway.
THE CORONAVIRUS MELTDOWN The current coronavirus crisis is having a critical impact on the mortgage industry, which could potentially make the 2008 financial crisis pale in comparison. The pressing issue centers around capital that's required by Mortgage Lenders to be able to function and meet covenants that are required for them to continue to lend.
HERES HOW THE MORTGAGE MARKET WORKS Let's begin with the mortgage process. A borrower goes to a Mortgage Originator to obtain a mortgage. Once closed, the loan is handled by a Servicer, which may or may not be the same company that originated the loan. The borrower submits payments to the Servicer, however, the Servicer does not own the loan, they are simply maintaining the loan. This means collecting payments and forwarding them to the investor (Fannie/Freddie/Ginnie), paying taxes and insurance, and answering questions, etc. While they maintain or "service" the loan, the asset itself is sold to an aggregator or directly to a government agency like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae. The loan then gets placed in a large bundle, which is put in the hands of an Investment Banker. The Investment Banker converts those loans into a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) that can be sold to the public. This shows up in different investments like Mutual Funds, Insurance Plans, and Retirement Accounts.
The Servicer's role is very critical. In order to obtain the right to service loans, the Servicer will typically pay 1% of the loan amount up front. The Servicer then receives a monthly payment or "strip" equal to about 30 basis points (bps) per year. Because they paid about 1% to obtain the servicing rights and receive roughly 30 bps annual income, the breakeven period is approximately 3 years. The longer that loan remains on the books, the more money the Servicer makes. In many cases, the Servicer may want to use leverage to increase their level of income. Therefore, they may often finance half the cost of acquiring the loan and pay the rest in cash.
SERVICER DILEMMA As you can imagine, when interest rates drop dramatically, there is an increased incentive for many people to refinance their loans more rapidly. This causes the loans that a Servicer had on their books to pay off sooner…often before that 3-year breakeven period. This servicing runoff creates losses for that Mortgage Lender who is servicing the loan. The more loans in a Mortgage Lender’s portfolio, the greater the loss. Servicing runoff, or even the anticipation of it, can adversely impact the market valuation of a servicing portfolio. But at the same time, Lenders typically experience an increase in new loan activity because of the decline in interest rates. This gives them additional income to help overcome the losses in their servicing portfolio.
But the Coronavirus has caused a virtual shutdown of the US economy, which has created an unprecedented amount of job losses. This adds a new risk to the servicer because borrowers may have difficulty paying their mortgage in a timely manner. And although the Servicer does not own the asset, they have the responsibility to make the payment to the investor, even if they have not yet received it from the borrower. Under normal circumstances, the Servicer has plenty of cushion to account for this. But an extreme level of delinquency puts the Servicer in an unmanageable position.
I'M FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND I'M HERE TO HELP In the Government’s effort to help those who have lost their jobs because of the Coronavirus shutdown, they have granted forbearance of mortgage payments for affected individuals. This presents an enormous obstacle for Servicers who are obligated to forward the mortgage payment to the investor, even though they have not yet received it. Fortunately, there is a new facility set up to help Mortgage Servicers bridge the gap to the investor. However, it is unclear as to how long it will take for Servicers to access this facility.
But what has not been yet contemplated is the fact that a borrower who does not make their first mortgage payment causes the loan to be ineligible to be sold to an investor. This means that the Servicer must hold onto the asset itself, which ties up their available credit. And with so many new loans being originated of late, the amount of transactions that will not qualify for sale is significant. This restricts the Lender’s ability to clear their pipeline and get reimbursed with cash so they can now fund new transactions.
MARK TO MARKET This week - Due to accelerated prepayments and the uncertainty of repayment, the value of servicing was slashed in half from 1% to 0.5%. This drastic decrease in value prompted margin calls for the many Servicers who financed their acquisition of servicing. Additionally, the decreased value of a Lender’s servicing portfolio reduces the Lender’s overall net worth. Since the amount a lender can lend is based on a multiple of their net worth, the decrease in value of their servicing portfolio asset, along with the cash paid for margin calls, reduces their capacity to lend.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES The Fed’s desire to bring mortgage rates down isn’t just damaging servicing portfolios because of prepayments, it’s also wreaking chaos in Lenders’ ability to hedge their risk. Let’s look at what happens when a borrower locks in their mortgage rate with a Mortgage Lender. Mortgage rates are based on the trading of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). As Mortgage Backed Securities rise in price, interest rates improve and move lower. A locked rate on a loan is nothing more than a lender promising to hold an interest rate for a period of time, or until the transaction closes. The Lender is at risk for any MBS price changes in the marketplace between the time they agreed to grant the lock and the time that the loan closes.
If rates were to rise because MBS prices declined, the Lender would be obligated to buy down the borrower’s mortgage rate to the level they were promised. And since the Lender doesn’t want to be in a position of gambling, they hedge their locked loans by shorting Mortgage Backed Securities. Therefore, should MBS drop in price, causing rates to rise, the Lender’s cost to buy down the borrower’s rate is offset by the Lender’s gains of their short positions in MBS.
Now think about what happens when MBS prices rise or improve, causing mortgage rates to decline. On paper the Lender should be able to close the mortgage loan at a better price than promised to the borrower, giving the Lender additional profits. However, the Lender’s losses on their short position negate any additional profits from the improvement in MBS pricing. This hedging system works well to deliver the borrower what was promised, while removing market risk from the Lender.
But in an effort to reduce mortgage rates, the Fed has been purchasing an incredible amount of Mortgage Backed Securities, causing their price to rise dramatically and swiftly. This, in turn, causes the Lenders’ hedged short positions of MBS to show huge losses. These losses appear to be offset on paper by the potential market gains on the loans that the lender hopes to close in the future. But the Broker Dealer will not wait on the possibility of future loans closing and demands an immediate margin call. The recent amount that these Lenders are paying in margin calls are staggering. They run in the tens of millions of Dollars. All this on top of the aforementioned stresses that Lenders are having to endure. So, while the Fed believes they are stimulating lending, their actions are resulting in the exact opposite. The market for Government Loans, Jumbo Loans, and loans that don’t fit ideal parameters, have all but dried up. And many Lenders have no choice but to slow their intake of transactions by throttling mortgage rates higher and by reducing the term that they are willing to guarantee a rate lock.
Furthering the Fed’s unintended consequences was the announcement to cut interest rates on the Fed Funds Rate by 1% to virtually zero. Because the Fed’s communication failed to educate the general public that the Fed Funds Rate is very different than mortgage rates, it prompted borrowers in process to break their locks and try to jump ship to a lower rate. This dramatically increased hedging losses from loans that didn’t end up closing.
EVEN STEPHEN KING COULD NOT HAVE SCRIPTED THIS It’s been said that the Stock market will do the most damage, to the most people, at the worst time. And the current mortgage market is experiencing the most perfect storm. Just when volume levels were at the highest in history, servicing runoff at its peak, and pipelines hedged more than ever, the Coronavirus arrived. Lenders need to clear their pipelines, but social distancing is making it more difficult for transactions to be processed. And those loans that are about to close require that employment be verified. As you can imagine, with millions of individuals losing their jobs, those mortgages are unable to fund, leaving lenders with more hedging losses and no income to offset it.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW Fortunately, there are many smart people in the Mortgage Industry who are doing everything they can to navigate through these perilous times. But the Fed and our Government needs to stop making it more difficult. The Fed must temporarily slow MBS purchases to allow pipelines to clear. Lawmakers need to allow for first payment defaults, due to forbearance, to be saleable. And finally, the Fed must more clearly communicate that Mortgage Rates and the Fed Funds Rate are not the same. We have faith that the effects of the Coronavirus will subside and that things will become more normalized in the upcoming months.
So, that’s what’s going on - I’d love some input on the best way to use this info for trades. Personally I think that mid-sized loan servicers with minimal diversity are most at risk. Quicken isn't publicly traded, Wells Fargo is too big for their mortgage servicing alone to cripple them.
Edit: adding this - There are three main issues: 1.) margin call 2.) inability to sell recently originated loans with a forbearance in place prior to the first payment 3.) a servicer still needs to pay Fannie/Freddie/Ginnie even if someone with an existing loan is in forbearance
These can combine to be a huge cash burn. The fix for #1 is just that the Fed stops buying MBS but the second two require legislation.
So, what servicers are at risk?
EDIT MADE: I’m an idiot and the original post contained some figures for commercial MBS servicing by banks.
Originally I proposed a ticker weighted in CMBS and someone pointed out I’m an idiot. A couple people have commented COOP - Mr. Cooper has a $548B servicing portfolio, which is massive. They aren’t a bank and are solely a mortgage lendeservicer, so I do like that play.
So, 10/16 COOP 5p
TL;DR: If you want to know details of how residential mortgage loan servicers are at high risk due to CARES Act, theres about 20 mins of reading. Or, just know they are at high risk unless the government fixes some shit they broke.
submitted by HowGreatAreYourDanes to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Due Diligence: Toromont Industries Ltd. - Building Together For An Exciting Future

Due Diligence: Toromont Industries Ltd. - Building Together For An Exciting Future
Hi,
This is my first attempt at writing a DD report. I hope it makes sense.
Just a few cautionary words:
  • Grammar (and English in general) is not a skill of mine. There will be a few parts that you might have to decipher, good luck.
  • I tried not to provide too much commentary and stick to the facts. I know you are spending your valuable time reading this and you probably don't want to listen to some random guy on the internet pontificate.
  • For those of you who are easily offended/triggered, can't take a joke, or sarcasm isn't your taste, DO NOT click the spoilers.
Lastly, the following is just my findings, by no means is it a representation of all the information out there. It is just the baseline for me to have confidence in becoming an owner of the Company. Do your own due diligence or talk to a financial advisor to find what is best for you and your financial situation.
Happy reading!

Highlights

  • Over the last 5 years the stock price has more than doubled.
  • Toromont dominates market share over everything east of Manitoba in Canada.
  • Customer base is heavily diversified, giving the Company many opportunities to expand into multiple industries.
  • Dividend has increased for 31 consecutive years. It has been paid for 52 consecutive years
  • The management team is extremely knowledgeable and have a good track record

Introduction

Toromont Industries Ltd. (TSE:TIH) provides specialized equipment in Canada and the United States. The Company operates two business segments: The Equipment Group and CIMCO. The Equipment Group supplies specialized mobile equipment and industrial engines for Caterpillar Inc. (NYSE:CAT). Customers for this business segment vary from infrastructure contractors, residential and commercial contractors, mining companies, forestry companies, pulp and paper producers, general contractors, utilities, municipalities, marine companies, waste handling companies, and agricultural enterprises. CIMCO offers design, engineering, fabrication, and installation of industrial and recreational refrigeration systems.
The Company was founded in 1961 and operates out of Concord, Ontario. As at December 31, 2019, Toromont employed over 6,500 people in more than 150 locations across central/eastern Canada and the upper eastern United States.
The primary objective of the Company is to build shareholder value through sustainable and profitable growth, supported by a strong financial foundation.

Description of the 2 Main Business Segments

  1. The Equipment Group includes the following 6 business units:
  • Toromont CAT: one of the world’s largest Caterpillar dealerships which supplies, rents, and provides product support services for specialized mobile equipment and industrial engines
  • Battlefield Equipment Rentals: supplies and rents specialized mobile equipment as well as specialty supplies and tools.
  • Toromont Material Handling: supplies, rents, and provides product support services for material handling lift trucks
  • AgWest: an agricultural equipment and solutions dealer representing AGCO, CLAAS and other manufacturers’ products
  • SITECH: provides Trimble Inc (NASDAQ:TRMB technology products and services. Trimble is a SaaS company that provides positioning, modeling, connectivity, and data analytics software which enable customers to improve productivity, quality, safety, and sustainability. Target industries: land survey, construction, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, asset tracking, mapping, railways, utilities, mobile resource management, and government.)
  • Toromont Energy: supplies, constructs, and operates high efficiency power plants up to 50 MW, using Caterpillar's leading power generation technologies. Toromont Energy operates plants that supply energy to hospitals, district energy systems, and industrial processes.
  • Performance in this segment mainly depends on the activity in several industries: road building and other infrastructure-related activities, mining, residential and commercial construction, power generation, aggregates, waste management, steel, forestry, and agriculture.
  • Revenues are driven by the sale, rental, and servicing of mobile equipment for Caterpillar and other manufacturers to the industries listed above.
  • In addition, Toromont is the MaK engine dealer for the Eastern seaboard of the United States, from Maine to Virginia.
  • MaK engine is a marine diesel engine manufactured by Caterpillar
  1. CIMCO is a market leader in the design, engineering, fabrication, installation and after-sale support of refrigeration systems
  • Performance in this segment is dependent on the activity in several industries: beverage and food processing, cold storage, food distribution, mining, and recreational ice rinks.
  • CIMCO has manufacturing facilities in Canada and the United States and sells its solutions globally.
  • CIMCO services the ice rinks of 23 out of 31 NHL teams. So if you are watching a game and the ice is shitty, you know who to blame… the Ice Girls, obviously.
  • For those of you who live in the GTA and have skated on The Barbara Ann Scott Ice Trail at College Park, the trail was created using CIMCO proprietary CO2 refrigeration technology.

Management

CEO, Scott J. Medhurst has been with the company since 1988. He was appointed President of Toromont CAT in 2004 and he came into his current position as President and CEO in 2012. He is a graduate of Toromont’s Management Trainee Program.
CFO, Mike McMillan joined the executive team in March of 2020. His predecessor, Paul Jewer is retiring this year and has been working with McMillan during the transition period.
VP and COO, Michael Chuddy has been with Toromont since 1995.
On average, leaders have 29 years of business experience and have served at Toromont for 19 years. Seeing long tenures, good stock performance, excellent business planning and execution is usually a sign of strong leadership. In addition, insiders hold more than 3% (~$175 million) of the company’s outstanding shares. Medhurst owns more than 170 thousand shares, Chuddy owns just under 100 thousand shares and the former CEO and current Independent Chairman of Board of Directors, Robert Ogilvie owns more than 2 million shares, making him the 4th largest stockholder. High insider ownership typically signals confidence in a company's prospects. Compare this to Toromont’s main Canadian competitor, Finning, where insiders own less than 0.4% ($12 million) of the company (this number varies depending on where you look, I just took the highest one I found).
Recently insiders have been selling stock (Figure 1). I cannot speak to the reasons why insiders are selling but the remaining position owned by the insider is sizable and demonstrates that the executive still has confidence in the company. Some of the reasons insiders sell are: they don't believe in the company’s future, they need money for personal use, they are rebalancing their portfolio, among others.
Figure 1: Buy and selling activity of insiders (the data is from MarketBeat, so take that for what it's worth).
On a somewhat unrelated but still related note, 50% of Toromont employees are also shareholders.

Growth Strategies

Toromont has five growth strategies (expand markets, strengthen product support, broaden product offerings, invest in resources, and maintain a strong financial position). I chose to focus on the following two strategies, as they seemed most prevalent.
  1. Expand Markets
  • Toromont serves a wide variety of end markets: mining, road building, power generation, infrastructure, agriculture, and refrigeration. This allows for many opportunities for growth while staying true to their core competency. Further expansion into new markets doesn't require Toromont to build a whole new business model or learn the intricacies of the new industry because their products stays the same. Thus, the main concern is the application/selection of the products for the customer.
  • Expansion is generally incremental. Each business unit focuses on market share growth and when the right opportunity presents itself, geographic expansion is archived through acquisitions.
  1. Strengthening Product Support
  • In an industry where price competition is high, product support activities represent opportunities to develop closer relationships with customers and differentiate Toromont’s product and service offering from competitors. After-market support is an integral part of the customer's decision-making process when purchasing equipment.
  • Product support revenues are more consistent and profitable.

Growth Through Acquisition

Rapid growth in this industry is generally driven through acquisitions. Toromont has gone through multiple acquisitions since the 90’s:
  • Acquisition of the Battlefield Equipment Rentals in 1996
    • Toromont grew Battlefield from one location to 82 locations
  • Acquisition of two privately held agricultural dealerships in Manitoba to form AgWest Equipment Ltd
  • Acquisition of Hewitt Group of companies in Q3 2017 for a total consideration of $1.0177 billion
    • $917.7 million cash ($750 million of which was finances through unsecured debt) plus the issuance of 2.25 million Toromont shares (equating to $100 million based on the 10 day average share price)
Acquisition of Hewitt Group of companies
This acquisition allowed Toromont to make headway into the Quebec, Western Labrador, and Maritime markets, as Hewitt was the authorized Caterpillar dealer of these regions. Hewitt was also the Caterpillar lift truck dealer of Quebec and most of Ontario and the MaK marine engine dealer for Québec, the Maritimes, and the Eastern seaboard of the United States (from Maine to Virginia).
Toromont had total assets of $1.51 billion before the acquisition, the acquisition added $1.024 billion in assets, nearly doubling the balance sheet (look at Figure 2 for more details about the acquisition).
Figure 2: (all numbers are in thousands) The final allocation of the purchase price was as of Dec 31, 2018, Note 25 of 2018 Annual Report. $1.024 billion was added to the Toromont’s B/S
Large acquisitions like this one can be the downfall of a company. Here are some of the risks highlighted by management at the time of the acquisition:
  • Potential for liabilities assumed in the acquisition to exceed our estimates or for material undiscovered liabilities in the Hewitt Business
  • Changes in consumer and business confidence as a result of the change in ownership
  • Potential for third parties to terminate or alter their agreements or relationships with Toromont as a result of the acquisition
  • Whether the operations, systems, management, and cultures of Hewitt and Toromont can be integrated in an efficient and effective manner
In 2018, the Company started and successfully completed the integration of the Maritime dealerships acquired through Hewitt under Toromont’s decentralized branch model (bottom up approach). Under a decentralized model, regional leadership make business decisions based on local conditions, rather than taking top down mandates. A bottom up approach is an advantage in businesses like Toromont where the customer mix can vary vastly from region to region. It allows for decision-making that is better aligned with customemarket needs and more attuned to the key performance indicators used to manage the business. In 2019, the integration of the decentralized branch model was implemented in Quebec after its success in Atlantic Canada in 2018. Successful integration of Hewitt into the Toromont family shows the depth of industry and business knowledge possessed by the management team. Being able to maintain inherited customer relationships and ensure low turnover is no easy feat. Many companies have completely botched these kinds of acquisitions. One that comes to mind is Sobeys (the second largest food retailer in Canada) acquiring Safeway for $5.8 billion. Three years later, they wrote off $2.9 billion as a loss because they did not anticipate the differences in consumer habits in Western Canada vs Eastern Canada, among other oversights.
The result of the acquisition and Hewitt’s integration with Toromont’s existing business produced a 39% increase in EPS in 2018 and 14% increase in 2019.

Dividend

Toromont pays a quarterly dividend and has historically targeted a dividend rate that approximates 30 - 40% of trailing earnings from continuing operations.
In February 2020 the Board of Directors increased the quarterly dividend by 14.8% to $0.31 per share. This marked the 31st consecutive year of increasing dividends and 52nd consecutive year of making a dividend payment. The five-year dividend-growth rate is 12.09%.
Table 1: Information about the last eight dividends

Risks/Threats and Mitigation

Dependency on Caterpillar Inc.
It goes without saying that Toromont’s future is heavily dependent on Caterpillar Inc. (NYSE:CAT). For those who don't know, Caterpillar is the world’s leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines, and diesel-electric locomotives. It has a market cap in excess of $68 billion. All purchases made by Toromont must be made from Caterpillar. This agreement has been standing since 1993 and can be terminated by either side with 90 days notice.
Given that the vast majority of Toromont’s inventory is Caterpillar products, Caterpillar’s brand strength and market acceptance are essential factors for Toromont’s continued success. I would say that the probability of either of these being damaged to an unrecoverable point are low, but at the beginning of this year, I would have said the probability of the world coming to a complete stop was very low too and look at what happened. Anything is possible. The reason this is a major consideration is because it's a going concern issue. Going conference is an accounting term for a company that has the resources needed to continue operating indefinitely until it provides evidence to the contrary. This term also refers to a company's ability to make enough money to stay afloat or to avoid bankruptcy. If there was irrevocable damage to Caterpillar’s brand, Toromont is no longer a going concern, meaning the company would most likely be going bankrupt or liquidating assets. The whole Company might not go under because the CIMCO, SITECH, and AgWest business units would survive but, essentially ~80% of the business would be liquidated.
In addition to the morbid scenario I laid out above, Toromont is also dependent on Caterpillar for timely supply of equipment and parts. There is no assurance that Caterpillar will continue to supply its products in the quantities and time frames required by Toromont’s customers. So if there is supply chain shock, like the one we just saw, there is the chance that Toromont will not have access to sufficient inventory to meet demand. Which in turn would lead to the loss of revenue or even to the permanent loss of customers.
Again, both of these threats have low a probability of occurring but either could single handedly cripple Toromont’s business. As of now, Caterpillar continues to dominate a large market share (~38% as per Gurufocus) in the industry against large competitors like John Deere, CNH Industrial, Cummins, and others.
Caterpillar's stock has been on a slow decline for a couple years but that is due to reasons beyond the ones that directly concern Toromont’s day-to-day operations. I would say if you don't believe in Caterpillar’s continued market share dominance, investing in Toromont is probably not for you.
Shortage of Skilled Workers
Shortage of skilled tradesmen represents a pinch point for industry growth. Demographic trends are reducing the number of individuals entering the trades, thus making access to skilled individuals more difficult. Additionally, the company has several remote locations which makes attracting and retaining skilled individuals more difficult. The lack of such workers in Canada has caused Toromont to become more assertive and thoughtful in their recruitment efforts.
To combat this threat, Toromont has/is:
  • Recruited 303 technicians to achieve growth targets
  • Created 208 student apprenticeship programs
  • Working with 19 vocational institutions in Toronto to teach about best practices and introduce the Company as a future employer to students
As a result of these initiatives and others, Toromont saw their workforce grow by ~8% 2019. Growing the workforce is one of the primary building blocks for future growth.
Cyclical Business Cycle
Toromont’s business is cyclical due to its customers' businesses being cyclical. This affects factors such as exchange rates, commodity/precious metal pricing, interest rates, and most importantly, inventory management. To mitigate this issue, management has put more focus on increasing revenues from product support activities as they are more profitable than the equipment supply business and less volatile.
Environmental Regulations Affecting Customers
Toromont’s customers are subject to significant and ever-increasing environmental legislation and regulation. This leads to 2 impacts:
  1. Technical difficulty in meeting environmental requirements in product design -> increased costs
  2. Reduction in business activity of Toromont’s customers in environmentally sensitive areas -> reduced revenues
Threats such as these come with a business of this type. As an investor in Toromont, you can't do much to mitigate these kinds of threats because it's out of your hands. Oil and gas, mining, forestry, and infrastructure projects are major drivers of the Canadian economy, so I think there will always be opportunity for Toromont to make money, regardless of government action.
Impact of COVID19
While the company had been declared as an essential service in all jurisdictions that it operates in, Q1 2019 results were lower as a function of COVID19 reducing activity in many sectors that Toromont services. Decline in mining and construction projects lead to a decrease in demand for Toromont products in the latter part of the quarter. Revenues were trending for 5-7% growth for the quarter before the effects of COVID19 were felt.
Management cannot provide any guidance on how to evaluate the impact of COVID19 on future financial results. They are focusing on ensuring the continued safety of employees and working with customers and the jurisdiction they operate in to evaluate appropriate activity levels on a daily/weekly basis. Lastly, management is keeping a close eye on how this crisis has led to an increase in A/R delinquencies and financial hardship for customers.
The Executive Team and the Board of Directors have taken a voluntary compensation reduction. Wage increase freezes and temporary layoffs have been implanted on a selective basis. Management believes that expanding product offerings and services, strong financial position, and disciplined operating culture positions the Company well for continued growth in the long term.
Competition
Toromont competes with a large number of international, national, regional, and local suppliers. Although price competition can be strong, there are a number of factors that have enhanced Toromont’s ability to compete:
  • Range and quality of products and services
  • Ability to meet sophisticated customer requirements
  • Distribution capabilities including number and proximity of locations
  • Financing through CAT Finance
  • E-commerce solutions
  • Reputation
  • Financial health

Main Competitor in Canada: Finning International Inc.

Finning International Inc. (TSE:FTT) is the world's largest Caterpillar dealer that sells, rents and provides parts and service for equipment and engines to customers across diverse industries, including mining, construction, petroleum, forestry and a wide range of power systems applications. Finning was founded in 1933 and is headquartered in Vancouver, Canada.

Toromont Industries Ltd Finning International Inc.
Market Cap $5.84B $3.02B
Price $65.66 $18.49
Dividend Yield 1.87% 4.36%
Number of Employees >6,500 >13,000
Revenues (ttm) $3.69B $7.57B
Trailing P/E Ratio 19x 11x
Price/Book 3.71x 1.35x
Profit Margin 7.71% 3.54%
Places of Operations Manitoba, Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador, most of Nunavut, and the Northeastern United States British Columbia, Yukon, Alberta, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, a portion of Nunavut, UK, Ireland, Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile
Table 2: A quick comparison between Toromont and Finning.
I am sure there are some people looking at this table and thinking Finning looks rather promising based on the metrics shown, especially in comparison to Toromont. Finning’s dividend yield, P/E, and price/book look more attractive. Their top line is 2x. Not to mention it operates worldwide and is the only distributor in the UK, while Toromont only operates in half of Canada.>! Before you go off thinking “I need to use my HELOC to buy some Finning,” as some people on this subreddit are prone to do, ask yourself: do you see any cause for concern in the metrics listed above? !<
One glaring question I have is: why is Finning trading at half of Toromont’s market cap given that it operates internationally and has twice the number of employees and revenues of Toromont?

Q1 2020 Financial Results


Figure 3: Q1 2020 Income Statement
Overall operating income, net earnings, and EPS all decreased even though Toromont saw an increase in revenue for the quarter compared to Q1 of 2019.
  • All of these decreases were contributed to COVID19, as the pandemic lead to increases in costs
Historically, Q1 has always been Toromont’s weakest quarter. Q1 accounts for ~20% of yearly earnings and is consistently the least profitable quarter. Toromont’s profit margin generally ranges from 5%-9% progressively increasing into the later half of the year. This is good news for investors with the thesis that the economy will return to "somewhat normal" in the latter half of this year. The majority of the earnings for 2020 are still on the table for Toromont to earn. If current conditions persist, or there is a second wave and lockdown later in the year, we will most likely see a regression in Toromont’s growth to last year’s levels or even lower.
Assuming the world does return to “normal,” many of Toromont’s customers (especially in mining and construction) may try to catch up for lost time with increases to their operational activity, leading to an increase in Toromont’s sales for the remainder of the year. Of course this is a major assumption but it’s a possibility.
Below is a comparison of the last eight quarters. You can see the clear cyclical nature of their business.
Figure 4: Last eight quarters of earnings

Sources of Liquidity

Credit
  • Toromont has access to a $500 million revolving credit facility, maturing in October 2022
  • On April 17 2020 they secured an additional $250 million as a one year syndicate facility
Cash Position
  • Cash increased by 22.6 million for the quarter
  • Cash from operations increased 13% Q1 2020 compared to Q1 2019
  • The company also drew $100 million from their revolving credit facility
  • $4 million dollars of stocks were repurchased during Q1 2020
Given their access to $750.0 million dollars of credit and cash on hand equaling $388.2 million, the Company should have sufficient liquidity to operate if COVID19 and its aftermath persist for an extended period of time.

Financial Analysis

Analysis of Debt
Historically, Toromont has had very low debt levels. The spike in late 2017 was due to the acquisition of Hewitt. Management paid off the debt aggressively in 2018. At the end of December 2019 Toromont had $650 million of debt maturing between 2025 and 2027. As a result of COVID19 the company has taken on more debt. This additional access to debt accounts of the slight uptick in historical debt in 2020 (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Toromont’s historical debt, equity, and cash
The long-term debt to capitalization ratio is a variation of the traditional debt-to-equity ratio. The long-total debt to capitalization ratio is a solvency measure that shows the proportion of debt a company uses to finance its assets, relative to the amount of equity used for the same purpose. A higher ratio means that a company is highly leveraged, which generally carries a higher risk of insolvency with it.
The debt-to-equity ratio is at 47% and debt-to-capitalization ratio is 32%, Toromont has $388 million in cash that could be used to pay down debt by nearly 50% and bring the net debt-to-equity to 23% and net debt-to-capitalization to 18%. As mentioned before, management is holding on to cash to insure sufficient liquidity during these times.
The implication of these ratios is that Toromont does not take on large amounts of debt to finance growth. Instead the Company leverages shareholders equity to drive growth.
For comparison, Finning has a debt-to-equity ratio of ~100% (it differs between WSJ, 99%, and Yahoo Finance, 101%). The nominal amount of their total debt is ~$2.2 billion, which gives them a long-term debt to capitalization ratio 62%. Finning carries $260 million in cash.
Figure 6: Toromont’s debt-to-capitalization and debt-to-equity ratios
Profitability Ratios
Return on equity (also known as return on net assets) measures how effectively management is using a company’s assets to create profits.
Toromont’s return on equity is generally around 20%. Go to Figure 6 to look at the ROE for the last 4 years. In comparison, Finning has had a ROE of ~11% for the last three years, about 3% in 2016 and a negative ROE in 2015 (as per Morningstar).
Return on capital employed (ROCE) tries to find the return relative to the total capital employed in the business (both debt & equity less short-term liabilities). Toromont’s ROCE (ttm) for March 31 2020 was 22%. This means for every dollar employed in the business 22 cents were earned in EBIT (earnings before interest and tax). Finning had a ROCE of 11% as of December 2019.
Liquidity Ratios
Working capital is the amount of cash and other current assets a business has available after all its current liabilities are accounted for. In the last ten years, Toromont’s working capital has fluctuated between 1.6 at its lowest (2018) to 2.8 at its highest (2016). At the end of 2019 it was at 1.8. Meaning current liabilities equate to 60% of current assets.
Interest coverage ratio is used to determine how easily a company can pay their interest expenses on outstanding debt. Toromont has an interest coverage ratio 15x (as per WSJ). Finning on the other hand is at 4x. At this point I feel like I'm just beating up on Finning.
For those of you who made it this far, I have to admit something to you. This whole post is just a facade to ask you a question that has never been asked on this subreddit before: Should I buy BPY.UN? It keeps going down and I'm worried if I buy it, it will keep going down and I'll lose money. I don't want to lose money. Although if you go through my post history, you'll see I've been looking at/buying penny stocks.

Key Performance Measures

Below is a chart with key financial measures for the last four years. A few things I want to highlight:
  • Toromont had large capital expenditure last year (most of it went to increasing inventory) so they have the choice to keep capital expenditure down this year and preserve cash
  • From the start of 2018 (aka end of 2017) to the end of 2018 Toromont stock was down about 3% while the TSX Composite was down more 12% and S&P was down 7%. This stock has a history of out performance not only on the upside but also on the downside. I'll go into a bit more detail in the next section.
Figure 7: Summary of key financial measure for the last four years

Price Chart Comparisons

I don't do technical analysis. To those who do, good luck to you because let's be real, you'll need it. This section is just to get an idea of past performance and evaluate the opportunity cost of investing in Toromont compared to a competitor or a board based index fund.
I thought it would be easier to look at pictures as opposed to reading a bunch of numbers off a table.
For the sake of not creating a picture album of screenshots, I just looked at charts for the last 5 years. If you're interested in looking at different time intervals you can do so on google finance.

  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. Finning International Inc.
Figure 8: Five year price chart of TIH v. FTT
These are the only two Caterpillar distributors on the TSX, making them direct comparisons. If I was looking for exposure to this industry, I would be choosing between these two companies (on the TSX anyways). There isn't really much to evaluate here. It's like they saying: “A picture is a thousand words,” or in this case, it's 128%. If you have time, go look at the graph from August 1996 to now. I can safely say it hasn't been much of a competition. Toromont has outperformed by ~2500% in stock price appreciation alone. If you're a glass half full kind of person, I guess you could look at this disparity as Finning having enormous upside. LOL

  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. S&P 500 Index
Figure 9: Five year price chart of TIH v. VFV
If I'm not buying individual stocks, I’m buying the S&P 500 and to a lesser extent a Nasdaq index fund. This gives me a second look at the opportunity cost of my money. The story is not as bad as the Finning comparison. If you had bought $100 dollars of Toromont stock 5 years ago, it would have turned into $207 today, whereas the same $100 dollars in VFV would have became $157.
Just a quick aside, you can see the volatility in Toromont’s stock is much higher compared to the VFV. VFV has a relatively smooth trend upwards while Toromont trends upwards in a jagged path. This is the risk of single stocks, they move up and down more erratically, leading inventors who don't have a grasp of the business or conviction in their pick to panic sell or post countless times on Reddit asking why their stocks keep going down. “I bought the stock last week and it's done 3% already, do you guys think it’s going bankrupt? I thought stonks only go up???”

  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. S&P/TSX Capped Industrials Index
Figure 10: Five year price chart of TIH v. ^TTIN
The S&P/TSX Capped Industrials Index isn't my favourite comparison for Toromont because its constituents cover many industries ranging from waste management (WCN), to railways (CNCP), to Airlines (AC, lol, had to mention it. I miss the days when there were double digits posts about AC. I wonder where those people have gone, because I can tell you where AC stock has gone... absolutely nowhere). Regardless, I used TTIN because I deemed it a better comparison to Toromont than the entire TSX. The story is on par with the other two comparisons. Toromont’s out performance is significant.
I just threw this bonus chart in here because when I saw it, I was like BRUHHH (insert John Wall meme)… It's completely unsustainable but that's impressive given the vast differences between the two.
  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. NASDAQ-100
Figure 11: Five year price chart of TIH v. ZQQ
Now, of course, past performance does not dictate future results and all that good stuff, but it really gets you thinking about how the rewards disproportionately favours winners compared to the overall market. People are generally happy getting market returns (i.e. the just buy VGRO people) but being able to pick even a few winners really pays. This reminds me of the Warren Buffet quote: “diversification is protection against ignorance.” The context of the quote is that if you are able to study a few industries in great depth and acquire a wealth of knowledge, you can see returns astronomically higher than those who diversify across the board market. The problem then becomes you put yourself at risk of having all your eggs in one basket. Look at what's happening with Wirecard in Europe right now. This is why the real skill in investing is managing risk.

Analyst Price Targets and Estimates

The prince targets set for by analysts range from $63-$81. The average price target is ~$72, with the majority of targets within the 70-$71 range. Given the current price of $65.66, there is a ~10% upside. These price targets haven't changed much due to COVID19 even though revenues and EPS forecasts have been downgraded for 2020. The consensus estimate on 2020 revenues is $3.36 billion, down from the actual revenues of $3.69 billion in 2019 and the consensus EPS for 2020 is $3.01 down from actual EPS of $3.52 for 2019 and $3.10 for 2018. The fact that revenues and EPS forecasts have been downgraded, yet price targets remain untouched, for the most part, indicates that the effects of COVID19 are expected to be short-lived.
Figure 12: Earnings and estimate ranges for Toromont. Note: EPS numbers in this graphic are diluted EPS numbers.

Valuation

Multiples
Assuming P/E ratio stays the same as it has been for the last 12 months (~19x) and EPS goes down to ~$3.00 (as per analyst consensus), the implied price would be $57.
Using the last 12 months of revenues, the EV-to-Revenues ratio is at 1.56x. Assuming that ratio stays the same and with revenues estimated to be ~$3.36 billion, enterprise value (EV) comes out to $5.2416 billion. Using Q1 2020 figures for shares outstanding (82.015 million), cash ($388.182 million), and debt ($745.703 million), the implied price for a share is $58.94*.
\Note: Enterprise Value is equal to market cap plus total debt minus cash.)
Dividend Discount Model
The dividend discount model (DDM) is a method of valuing a company's stock price based on the theory that its stock is worth the sum of all of its future dividend payments, discounted back to their present value.
The average dividend growth rate is 12% for the last 5 years is 12%. There is no way Toromont can increase the dividend at this pace in the long term, thus, I chose a long term dividend growth rate of 5%. This is the assumed rate in perpetuity. The required rate of return will equal WACC, 6.85% (averaged from 2019 Annual Report). The dividend over the last year is $1.16 (two payments of $0.27 in 2019 and two payments of $0.31 for 2020).
The fair value equals $65.84.
Figure 13: DDM calculation.

Closing Thoughts

There is no doubt that Toromont trades at a large premium. The current P/E is 19x and the CAPE ratio (Shiller P/E) is 26x. The fair value of the Company as per Morningstar research is in the mid $60 range.
Based on all valuations I did and analyst price targets, I would start buying in the high $50 range or maybe the very low $60 range, but my belief in the company has to do with long term thematic trends and how the Company operates, rather than today's price. Although I have to admit, the price does look more attractive now than it did in the beginning of June when the stock hit new all time highs. It seems like the only companies hitting new all time highs these days are tech companies, so it's refreshing to find a non-tech company achieving the same feat.
Toromont is not going to double next year or the year after that. It is a relatively low margin business, with slow growth and a cyclical business cycle. I like that the Company has strong financials, low debt, and good management. They don't take shortcuts or unwarranted risk. Future growth will mostly be driven through acquisition, but management is cautious with acquisitions and don't overextend themselves. One of the biggest problems Finning has been facing for the last couple years is political and social turmoil in South American countries which is affecting their mining clients and thus affecting revenues/margins.
The Q2 earnings are reported on July 22 202. We should have a clearer picture on the prospects of the Company from management. Hopefully we have a better idea of the COVID19 situation by then too. Regardless, I think the company is in a position where its services will always be in demand so short term fluctuations are not something that shake my confidence in this pick.

Limitations and Further Areas of Research

By no means is this an exhaustive due diligence report. This is enough for me to feel confident in the business and its trajectory. Limitations/further areas of the research include:
  • Looking into the growth of each sector Toromont services and extrapolating that growth to calculate Toromont’s future growth opportunity.
    • As per IBIS Research the heavy equipment rental market in Canada is ~$8.3 billion. It grew 1.1% yearly for the last 5 years.
    • The US market is estimated to be $47 billion, with an average growth of 2% for the last 5 years
      • Sorry but I couldn't get my hands on future projections as each report is $750
  • More research into competitors
    • I chose to include Finning only for simplicity’s sake. But there are many other competitors like:
      • United Rentals (NYSE:URI) provides similar services to Toromont/Finning in 49 U.S. states, 10 Canadian provinces, Puerto Rico and four European countries. The only thing being they aren't distributors for Caterpillar.
      • Rocky Mountain Dealerships Inc (TSE:RME) sells, leases, and provides product and warranty support for agriculture and industrial equipment in Western Canada
      • Holt Cat, N C Machinery, Ziegler CAT (none of these companies are publicly traded)
  • Further analysis can be done on the B/S and accounting treatments.
  • The effects of automation in the industry
    • Distributors in the US have started working with industrial automation companies to provide autonomous construction equipment on rent to contractors
      • Sunstate Equipment Co.'s partnership with Built Robotics
  • I was not able to do a discounted cash flow, which would be critical to finding the intrinsic value for Toromont and having true confidence in the company and its trajectory.
  • Further analysis of CIMCO and prospects of future growth
    • Based of the financials, CIMCO seemed like a small part of the business, which is why I mainly focused on the Caterpillar dealership side
These are not all the limitations or areas of further research, they are just the glaring one that came to mind.
>! I know I took a few shots at people in this post. It's all in good jest. If you're offended well.... maybe you should be. I don't know, you have to figure that out on your own or you could make a post on Reddit asking random people on the internet whether you should be offended or not. !<
Remember I'm not an expert, I'm just a random guy on the internet.

Disclosure

I am long Toromont. This information is not financial advice. Please do your own research and/or talk to a financial advisor. All data provided is current prior to the market opening on June 29, 2020. Inconsistencies in data can be due to many reasons, the foremost being that data was spruced from multiple different websites.
submitted by Dr_Sargunz to CanadianInvestor [link] [comments]

LOW (Lowe's Companies Inc.); A dd

Disclosure; I DID NOT WRITE THIS, but why should I, what do you think I am, smart? No, no I am not, so that is why I used the words of people who actually went to college for this shit.
157.5c 8/28
Hello again fellow retards and autists, I have another fundamentally backed DD, which seemed to work for the last time to forecast if an earnings announcement will beat estimates.
Today, the DD is for LOW (Lowe's Companies Inc.)
Background; Lowe's Companies, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a home improvement retailer in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The company offers a line of products for construction, maintenance, repair, remodeling, and decorating.
Fundamentals;
CFRA;
Home improvement should benefit from a significant shift in consumer spending, in our view, to the home from travel, live events, and restaurants. We think the new normal from Covid-19 could be households investing more in their homes, whether they be the backyard, or remodeling a kitchen or bathroom, or finishing a basement. The Do-It-Yourselfsegment showed strong sales in Apr-Q, and we think the PRO segment (contractors) is picking up. Another catalyst for LOW, in our view, is the housing market, which may have more substantial sales growth in the second half of 2020.
Risks to our recommendation and target include a severe recession, a decline in home improvement projects, and reduced consumer confidence.
LOW, with new management, is still in the middle innings of transforming the company with improved sales execution, inventory controls, better supply chain, and revamped stores, in our opinion. With better operational performance, we think LOW can deliver improved sales growth in FY 21 (Jan.). We see7.0%-9.0% same-store sales growth in FY 21, as we see LOW divest unprofitable stores, especially in Canada, and invest in its operations from supply chain to store operations. Same-store or comp sales for U.S.stores were up 12.3% in Apr-Q.
LOW is moving to staff outsourcing to reduce costs while improving new merchandising and investing in its supply chain system, which will likely boost sales with the PRO segment for local contractors. We expect FY 21 operating margins to widen to 10.5%-11.0%, from 9.1%in FY 20.
We believe LOW is executing better, especially on supply chain processes and store management. New investments for lowes.comis showing positive sales traction with digital sales up 80% in Apr-Q. The company is moving its decade-old platform to Google Cloud. DuringCovid-19, we think it has enabled LOW to compete as an omnichannel retailer with a user-friendly website.
CORPORATE OVERVIEW. Lowe's Companies, Inc. (LOW) is the world's second-largest home improvement retailer. As of January 31, 2020, Lowe's operated 1,977 home improvement and hardware stores, representing 208.2 million sq. Ft. of retail selling space.
CORPORATE STRATEGY. The company has brought on a new management team that is executing a new strategy with a sharper focus on its core business, divesting non-core units such as Orchard SupplyHardware stores with a $230 million non-cash charge, and aligning its goals with shareholder value. The market opportunity is to accelerate its progress to capture a healthy and growing home improvement market in the U.S. market, in our opinion.
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE. LOW is second only to the market leader, Home Depot. While it is never good to be behind, LOW has upside potential to regain market share with better execution on its business plan to improve customer service, store availability of the most widely sold 1,000 items; and efficiencies in purchasing, supply chain, and store management, in our view. LOW has a home center exclusive on Craftsman products, meaning you can't get them at Home Depot or other stores.
LOW's management acknowledges that the company has a disadvantage to Home Depot, the market leader, in real estate locations in the metro areas in the Northeast and West Coast markets. Besides the physical store locations, LOW will work hard on targeting the do-it-yourself customer and its Pro segment. From our perspective, LOW's operational outlook is tied more to better execution than the competitive dynamics it faces with Home Depot in select U.S. regions.
LOW can be a better omnichannel retailer, whereby it can connect and align its systems and processes to drive an improved customer experience via online and in-store shopping. In our view, the home improvement segment has been resilient to substitution by online providers such as Amazon, as professional and consumer customers prefer to shop or pick up items in the stores. LOW states that 60% of its e-commerce purchases are picked up at local stores.
MARKET PROFILE. The company serves homeowners, renters, and professional customers (Pro customers). Individual homeowners and renters complete a wide array of projects and vary along the spectrum of do-it-yourself (DIY) and do-it-for-me (DIFM). The Pro customer consists of two broad categories: construction trades; and maintenance, repair & operations.
The U.S. market remains LOW's predominant market, accounting for 95% of consolidated sales in FY 19. From a market tracking perspective, the company's revenues are included in the Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers Subsector (444) of the Retail Trade Sector of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). This is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments to collect, analyze, and publish statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.
Many variables affect consumer demand for home improvement products and services LOW offers. Key indicators to monitor include real disposable personal income, employment, home prices, and housing turnover. We also track demographic and societal trends that shape home improvement in industry growth. We are positive on home improvement spending with home equity increasing from rising home prices for 96% of U.S. households that do not move. Affordability of purchasing a new home or resale is becoming an issue for most families that are recognizing the value of staying put in their homes. With rising home equity values, the opportunity shifts to higher spending for home improvement, where LOW is a direct beneficiary.
MANAGEMENT. The new CEO has brought senior executives for the CFO, merchandising, supply chain, and store management, and continues to look for a new chief information officer (CIO). In progress is a new strategic focus that enhances its resources, performance, and return of capital. The risk with new management, in our opinion, is distilling its strategy and operational excellence to the store manager level.
FINANCIAL TRENDS. At the end of Apr-Q, LOW has total liquidity at $9.0 billion: $6.0 billion in cash and cash equivalents and $3.0 billion in undrawn capacity on its revolving credit facilities for any unanticipated liquidity risk. During the Apr-Q, the company raised $4 billion in senior unsecured notes, suspended the share repurchase program, and paid $420 million in cash dividends by quarter-end. In Apr-Q, total days inventory outstanding improved to 94.9 days versus 103.2 days in the same period a year ago, while average days payable declined to 59.0 days in Apr-Q versus 61.5 days in the year-earlier quarter. Total debt to total capital was 93.9% in Apr-Q compared to 87.2% in the year-earlier quarter, as the company undertook actions to boost corporate liquidity during uncertain market conditions due to Covid-19.
TheStreet;
The revenue growth came in higher than the subsector average of 11.3%. Since the same quarter one year prior, revenues rose by 10.9%. Growth in the company's revenue appears to have helped boost the earnings per share.
Powered by its strong earnings growth of 34.35% and other important driving factors, this stock has surged by 54.40% over the past year, outperforming the rise in the S&P 500 Index during the same period. Turning to the future, naturally, any stock can fall in a major bear market. However, in almost any other environment, the stock should continue to move higher even though it has already enjoyed nice gains in the past year.
LOWE'S COS INC has improved earnings per share by 34.4% in the most recent quarter compared to the same quarter a year ago. The company has demonstrated a pattern of positive earnings per share growth over the past two years. We feel that this trend should continue. During the past fiscal year, LOWE'S COS INCincreased its bottom line by earning $5.47 versus $2.80 in the prior year. This year, the market expects an improvement in earnings ($6.89 versus $5.47).
The same quarter one year ago, the net income growth has significantly exceeded that of the S&P 500and the Building Material, Garden Equipment, Supplies Deal subsector. The net income increased by 27.8% compared to the same quarter one year prior, rising from $1,046.00 million to $1,337.00 million.
The company's current return on equity significantly increased when compared to its ROE from the same quarter one year prior. This is a signal of significant strength within the corporation. Compared to other companies in the Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies subsector and the overall market, LOWE'S COSINC's return on equity significantly exceeds that of both the subsector average and the S&P 500.
TL;DR Although LOW has direct competition with HD (Home Depot), there are some upsides it has (see COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE)
157.5c 8/28
🚀🚀🚀 and smd🌈🐻
Sources;
https://research.ameritrade.com/grid/wwws/research/reports/viewreport?id=20034&documenttag=LOW&c_name=invest_VENDOR
https://research.ameritrade.com/grid/wwws/research/reports/viewreport?id=72&documenttag=54866110&c_name=invest_VENDOR
Edit 1: With IV coming up in question a lot, it should be noted that, historically, around earnings, IV has crept to a high of ~70%, while with no news expected, the IV remains at a stable ~30%; so at most, a ~40% drop in IV wouldn't qualify it as a crush.
Edit 2: (shortened TL;DR) Recently (Aug. 12) Lowe's announced that they were adding fulfillment centers, large-appliance sites for faster delivery, meaning they have money to improve supply chain efficiency, which means they must be having more cash flown into the company 7 out of 3 stars deep for calls.
Edit 3: Completely forgot to mention a lumber shortage since early July that has been increasing in demand ever since, meaning increased revenue for LOW as LOW is a direct beneficiary of increased lumber prices - (sneaky edit here) The commodity ticker LBS for Lumber has had a nice run-up of 106.83% from 6/11 til now, and it is not showing signs of exhaustion.
Edit 4: My play(s); See where IV takes us and if it gets too high (70%+), I will close all my positions, if 50-60%+, will close 2/3 of my positions. After the earnings report, which they will beat (and that's a fact), I'll see where technicals stand, historically, if the stock is above the 200 and 21 MA after earnings, it moons to new highs, see 20 May '20, 20 Nov '19, 21 Aug '19 earnings, so calls are dirt cheap at the bottom of these post-earnings reversals, and buy back 8/28 or 9/4 calls and ride this train to tendie town.
Edit 5: Post seems ded now, but if you post something, at least be right or retarded.
submitted by Zentryl to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

How Brokers Earn from Margin Trading ? (Hindi) Margin Trading 101: How It Works - YouTube Margin Trading Facility Benefits of using Ventura’s Margin Trading Facility and How to activate it ★ Margin Trading on Binance Tutorial

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